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KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
David R. Macdonald* 
No. 3 
SIXTY-NINE years ago, a German inventor named Christensen walked into the offices of the American Aristotype Company 
and successfully demonstrated a secret process for manufacturing 
photographic printing-out paper. Thereupon, American Aristo-
type purchased exclusive rights to use the process and sell prod-
ucts made therefrom throughout the world, except in Europe and 
England. Christensen, in turn, agreed to limit his utilization of 
the process and sales to Europe and England. In commenting 
upon the validity of this agreement under the antitrust laws,1 a 
court of appeals in 1931 noted that it constituted "a typical sale qf 
property with a restrictive covenant against competition by the 
vendor, valid in law. The validity of the contract was heightened, 
if possible, by the character of the property-a grant of rights in a 
secret process. "2 
Eighteen years after this decision, another federal court in-
validated a territorial division contained in licenses of know-how 
pertaining to the manufacture of tapered roller bearings, stating: 
"One who possesses greater knowledge or superior skill in 
the manufacture of a product is entitled to be fairly and ade-
quately compensated if he furnishes his knowledge or skill to 
others. He is not entitled, however, to exact as a price for 
such contribution, complete freedom from competition. The 
quid pro quo for furnishing of know-how cannot be an ab-
solute license to avoid the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
The harm caused thereby would be too great a tribute to 
knowledge and skill when viewed in the light of public 
policy."8 
• Member of the Illinois Bar.-Ed. 
l Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958). 
2 Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592, 595 (3d Cir. 1931). 
s United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1949), 
af/'d, 841 U.S. 593 (1951). 
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Although these conflicting statements can find accommodation 
in the factual background from which they arose, the antitrust 
history of know-how licensing has been anything but enlightening 
to the businessman who seeks to exploit his company's superior 
technology by licensing others to utilize it. This is indeed un-
fortunate because know-how licensing is of considerable impor-
tance to United States industry and fiscal policy, especially with 
respect to foreign trade. Although exact figures are not available, 
the total gross royalty income received by United States firms from 
foreign licensing arrangements was estimated at 500,000,000 dol-
lars in 1957,4 of which know-how licensing undoubtedly consti-
tuted a substantial portion.5 The detrimental effect of this legal 
opacity on the promotion of overseas licensing arrangements may 
be easily exaggerated. The companies which have contributed to 
the balance of payments inflow, however, deserve better forewarn-
ing than they have received.6 The purpose of this article, there-
fore, is to re-analyze the present antitrust status of know-how 
licensing for the purpose of clarifying the extent of the protection 
which the exploiter of know-how may accord himself without 
abusing the public interest in unfettered competition.7 
I. THE NATURE OF KNow-How 
Know-how has been defined to include "inventions, processes, 
formulae, or designs which are either unpatented or unpatentable; 
4 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, FOREIGN LICENSING AGREEMENTS 11 (1958), 
quoting a study made by the American Enterprise Association for the Senate Special 
Committee To Study the Foreign Aid Program. The figure may well be double that 
amount today. The importance of know-how, as compared with patents and trademarks, 
is greater than might appear from an examination of license agreements because of the 
continued, although unsuccessful, refusal of the Internal Revenue Service to concede 
that know-how is "property," eligible for non-recognition as a contribution to capital 
under § 351 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, or for capital gains treatment as a 
"capital asset" under § 1221. 
5 See Behrmann & Schmidt, New Data on Foreign Licensing, 3 PATENT, TRADEMARK 
AND COPYRIGHT J. OF REsEARCH AND EDUCATION 370 (1959). 
6 See BREWSTER, ANTITRUsr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 267-68 (1958), in which 
the author suggests that the antitrust laws have had a deleterious effect on foreign know-
how licensing arrangements. 
7 On the subject of know-how or trade-secret licensing, see id. at 158-70; FUGATE, FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUsr LAws 207-11 (1958); OPPENHEIM, FEDERAL ANTITRUsr 
LAWS 1001-08 (2d ed. 1959); Note, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 298 (1959). On the subject of 
forced disclosure of know-how in connection with government contracts, see Beach, A 
Question of Property Rights: The Government and Industrial Know-How, 41 A.B.A.J. 
1024 (1955). For a general survey of licensing by foreign companies, see Behrmann, A 
Brief Look at Foreign Licensing by European Companies, 5 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT J. OF REsEARCH AND EDUCATION 130 (1961). 
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it may be evidenced by some form of physical matter, such as 
blue-prints, specifications, or drawings; . . . and it may involve 
accumulated technical experience and skills which can best, or 
perhaps only, be communicated through the medium of personal 
services."8 
More than a blue-print or data sheet, however, is necessary 
before the knowledge embodied in these media of communication 
can support competitive restrictions placed upon its recipient. 
The know-how must rise to the stature of a trade secret.9 This is 
true both when its owner attempts to protect himself against un-
lawful use by one who has misappropriated it, and when he at-
tempts to grant the know-how to others under what otherwise 
would be unlawfully restrictive contractual conditions.10 The term 
"know-how" as used herein, therefore, is limited to technical in-
formation fulfilling this requirement, that is, information which 
(I) is secret and (2) affords to its owner an opportunity to obtain 
a competitive advantage over those who do not possess it.11 The 
requirement of secrecy should not mean, however, that only one 
person has discovered it; 12 moreoever, the status of know-how as a 
trade secret should not suffer even if it is commonly known in some 
s Creed 8: Bangs, Know-How Licensing and Capital Gains, 4 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT J. OF RE5EARCH AND EDUCATION 93 (1960). 
9 Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 424, 425 (D. Md. 1946), 
aff d, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947). This is not to imply that any distinction between 
secret and non-secret know-how is recognized in the taxation of gains resulting from the 
sale or licensing of know-how. See Creed 8: Bangs, supra note 8. 
10 The degree of proof required to establish this threshold requisite seems to be less 
when the issue is misappropriation of the technical information (see, e.g., Franke v. 
Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); 
Tabor v. Hofnnan, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889)) than when the owner is attempting to 
utilize the information to justify restraints upon his licensee which otherwise would 
violate the antitrust laws. See Foundry Servs., Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F.2d 214 (2d 
Cir. 1953); Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931); United States v. EJ. du Pont 
de Nemours 8: Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), afj'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
11 Mycalex Corp. of America v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420, 425 (D. Md. 1946), 
aff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947); BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 
160 (1958); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757 (1939). Some factors to be considered in deter-
mining the existence of a trade secret; according to § 757 of the Restatement of 
Torts are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) 
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the 
extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value 
of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money 
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 
12 REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). This is particularly true when all 
owners are actively attempting to protect the know-how from others in the industry. 
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parts of the world, as long as the grant of know-how is made in a 
foreign country where such knowledge is unavailable.13 
Whether know-how is a form of property has been the subject 
of repeated discussion. The proponents of the property theory 
attempt to further their position by rather tautological analyses,14 
or by enumerating those legal attributes of property which are 
~mbodied in know-how or trade secrets.15 Opponents of the theory 
argue that know-how, unlike a patent, confers no universal power 
upon its owner to exclude others, and is defeasible as soon as the 
technology is acquired through honest industry.16 The protection, 
so the argument goes, is not protection afforded to an owner of 
property, but protection against unfair competition.17 Refuge is 
usually taken in Mr. Justice Holmes' statement that "the word 
'property' as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an un-
analyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the pri-
mary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of 
good faith."18 
From an antitrust standpoint, the question is irrelevant. In the 
first place, whatever know-how is called, it confers upon its posses-
.sor the exclusive, although perhaps temporary, right to utilize it. 
The partial ( or total) release of this right, exacted in return for 
limitations upon the utilization of the know-how itself, therefore, 
should raise no antitrust question.19 
In the second place, whether considered property or not, know-
13 See BREWSI'ER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 164•65; FUGATE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 
192·93. 
14 See, e.g., Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-How as a Growing Area of 
Industrial Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. OF 
REsEARCH AND EDUCATION 289 (1962). 
15 "It [a trade secret] can be the res of a trust; it is assignable, taxable, and will pass 
to a trustee in bankruptcy. It is, if reduced to writing, subject also to levy and sale under 
a common law writ of execution. It may be transferred for valuable consideration or by 
gift; such transfer, however, need not be in writing, and may be founded upon an implied 
as well as an express promise. A trade secret may also be transferred by mortgage." CALL-
MAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 857 (2d ed. 1950). See also Creed &: Bangs, 
supra note 8. 
16 See the reasoning employed in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park 8e Sons Co., 
220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911). 
17 The framers of the Regnlations governing enforcement of the Rome Treaty 
(Common Market) antitrust provisions have carefully avoided referring to secret technol-
ogy as industrial property. See, e.g., Article 4(2)(ii)(b) of Regulation 17, implementing 
.Articles 85, 86 of the Treaty. 
18 E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). This 
truism, however, does not avoid the fact that as soon as any term or label is interposed 
·between a factual situation and the legal results which flow therefrom, an "unanalyzed 
expression" of "secondary consequences" arises. This is, indeed, the nature of law. 
19 The legality of such limitations is discussed in Part II(B) infra. 
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how immanently contains a quantum of competitive value which is 
measurable by the time and cost necessary to accumulate it. This 
value, although contingently defeasible by outside discovery and 
publication, often far exceeds that embodied in a patent. In its 
highest form, know-how is everything that is necessary to create a 
going business other than capital and labor.20 Enterprises have paid 
and will continue to pay dearly for it. The validity of traditional 
restraints ancillary to the sale of a business or property depends 
upon the competitive value of the property sold rather than the 
fact that what is sold is "property"; similarly, competitive re-
straints pertaining to the products made by the use of the know-
how, and ancillary to the know-how grant or license, should not be 
rendered unenforceable on the basis of "property" distinctions. 
Moreover, so long as restraints are imposed solely upon those 
know-how licensees who have not discovered and cannot easily 
obtain the technology by themselves, the restraints should be valid, 
if reasonable. To the uninitiated licensee, at least, the know-how 
which is granted is figuratively a type of "property,"21 and the re-
straints exacted from him are less burdensome than the competi-
tive disability posed by his unfamiliarity with the secret tech,_ 
nology.22 
II. KNow-How AND ANTITRUST IN THE CouRTS 
A. Acquisition and Accumulation of Know-How 
The sale or transfer of know-how does not, of itself, violate 
the antitrust laws even though the seller covenants not to utilize 
it after the sale, since "the process must be kept secret in order to 
be of any value, and the public has no interest in the question by 
whom it is used."28 In addition, absent monopoly power or a 
specific intent to monopolize, the continued accumulation of ex-
clusive rights to know-how by an enterprise should not run afoul 
of the Sherman Act.24 Even with the existence of monopoly power, 
20 In its lowest form, know-how is the dribble of manufacturing or marketing 
minutiae necessarily produced in the course of running a business. It is the licensing of 
this latter information which may be and has been used as a sham to divide territories 
between competitors. 
21 In the sense in which Mr. Justice Holmes used the word when he defined a patent 
to be "property carried to the highest degree of abstraction-a right in rem to exclude 
without a physical object or content." HoLMES-PouoCK lxr:rERs 53 (Howe ed. 1944). 
22 The legality of ancillary restraints upon products manufactured by use of know-
how is discussed in Part II(C) infra. 
28 Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891). 
24 With respect to patent accumulation, compare Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. 
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certain purchases of know-how for legitimate business reasons 
would not be illegal.25 Without monopoly power the necessary un-
lawful intent in connection with the acquisition of know-how 
(violating section 2 of the Sherman Act) should not easily be im-
puted since, unlike patent acquisitions, know-how cannot be used 
as an offensive weapon to interfere with the business operations of 
others.26 Know-how, however, might well be deemed an "asset" 
within the meaning of the anti-merger provisions of the Clayton 
Act,27 and its exclusive acquisition from a competitor might be 
sufficient to result in the requisite anti-competitive effect.28 
Similarly, cross licensing of existing know-how, without more, 
should not violate the antitrust laws even though the licensee is 
prohibited from disclosing or sublicensing the know-how. The 
reciprocal accumulation of future know-how between competitors 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 834 (1950), with United States v. Vehicular Parking, 
Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828 (D. Del. 1944). There is, of course, always the possibility that Judge 
Hand's famous statement in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 
(2d Cir. 1945), may be applied to the acquisition of know-how: "It [Alcoa] insists that it 
never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than pro-
gressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every new comer 
with new capacity already geared into a great organization having the advantage of 
experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel." See also United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 307-12 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), in 
which the court found occasional patent acquisitions to evidence the requisite market 
power in a § 2 proceeding, as well as to show some exclusion of competition. 
25 Compare United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra note 24, at 310-11, in 
which the court discusses the Beacon and Blake patent acquisitions of the defendant. 
26 Patents, however, can be so used. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 1963 
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (Trade Cas.) 1[ 70813 (Sup. Ct., June 17, 1963). The acquisition of 
non-exclusive rights could hardly violate the antitrust laws at all, since the only com• 
petitive advantage obtained in this situation is that resulting from the manufacture of 
a superior or less expensive product, to the advantage of the ultimate consumer. But 
see, United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afl'd, 
332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
27 Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). "That no 
corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any 
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of 
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where, in any line of commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 
28 The House Report on the Celler-Kefauver Bill, amending the Clayton Act, stated: 
"The bill retains language of the present statute which is broad enough to prevent 
evasion of the central purpose. It covers not only the purchase of assets or stock but also 
any other method of acquisition, such as, for example, lease of assets. It forbids not only 
direct acquisitions but also indirect acquisitions, whether through a subsidiary or affiliate 
or otherwise." H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1949); see United States v. 
Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 
26, 48-49 (1956). See also United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963), holding the acquisition of a trademark and patents to be within the scope of the 
act. 
1964] KNow-How LICENSING 357 
through cross licensing arrangements, however, may be dangerous 
if monopoly power exists or is achieved thereby. Most of the cases 
which discuss the problem also involved express or implied restric-
tions on further sublicensing without mutual consent.29 This type 
of arrangement could be said to fall within the orbit of the patent 
pool cases.30 In the National Lead case, however, the exchange of 
future know-how by competitors occupying one hundred percent 
of the relevant market was condemned. Although each competitor 
had the right to sublicense, the Supreme Court held the agreement 
to be one involving market power of such magnitude that, under 
the anomalous Associated Press doctrine,31 the failure of either 
party to offer the technical information to all applicants without 
use restrictions was violative of the Sherman Act.82 
Finally, the power of the know-how licensor to require that his 
licensee grant back title or exclusive license to unpatented (or 
patented) improvements in technology should not be restricted to 
any greater extent than is the case with patent grant-back agree-
ments. Provided the grant-back agreement is limited in scope to 
improvements or modifications in the know-how granted and is 
not a means of perpetuating control over the industry, grant-back 
clauses should not be proscribed.33 
29 See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 
1949), in which the Court held that exclusive interchanges of know-how and inventions 
"to the exclusion of others" were "integral parts of the general scheme to suppress trade," 
although not a "direct instrument to eliminate competition." It seems apparent that 
neither party could sublicense the know-how without the consent of the other in this 
case. See also United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 
1951), in which an exclusive licensee could not sublicense in his territory without the 
consent of his licensor. Since the licensor could not sublicense in the territory either, 
the consent of both had to be obtained. This undoubtedly contributed to the court's 
finding of unreasonable restraint, despite the refusal of the court to determine the per 
se illegality of the agreement. Id. at 592. 
80 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 
332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1944). 
81 United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The Associated Press ruling 
cannot easily be categorized into traditional antitrust concepts. The case might best be 
described as holding that where two or more firms in the same industry join to establish 
any facility for their mutual benefit, and the facility affords at least one of them a 
substantial competitive advantage over others, they must make the facility available on 
reasonable terms to all who request it. 
82 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 531-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 
!132 U.S. 319 (1947). 
ss Stokes &: Smith Co. v. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp., 329 U.S. 637 (1947), on 
rema11d, 161 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. El. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 
ll8 F. Supp. 41, 224-25 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. General 
Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
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B. Limitations Within the Scope of the Know-How "Grant" 
The owner of a patent can, with impunity from the antitrust 
laws, place certain restrictions on his licensee so long as these 
restrictions fairly fall within the "ambit of his [patent] grant,"84 
which implicitly contains the right to exclude others "from mak-
ing, using or selling" his invention.85 Since a patent license is the 
"mere waiver of the right to sue" for patent infringement,86 the 
licensor can limit his waiver to something less than his full right 
to exclude. While the permissible scope of restrictions on a patent 
grant is not entirely clear, the grant is generally considered broad 
enough to enable the licensor to limit the licensee with respect to 
the number of products produced under the patent,87 the time in 
which the products can be produced (if less than the term of the 
patent), the manner of use of the products to be produced,38 and 
the area in which the patent will be utilized (within the area of 
exclusivity granted by the sovereign which issues the patent).89 
The owner of know-how also has the right to exclusive use of 
his secret technology, and may exercise that right in such time, 
place and manner as he may choose. This exclusive right, of 
course, is defeasible upon discovery and publication of the tech-
nology. Nevertheless, until the occurrence of this "condition sub-
sequent," the know-how owner may license the use of know-how 
to others and condition this grant by placing restrictions upon the 
time, place, or manner of such use (as opposed to restraints upon 
the products made from the know-how) without fear that the re-
strictions imposed might violate the antitrust laws. This is so be-
cause the license itself, like a patent license, is a partial release of 
his monopoly position rather than the imposition of an additional 
restraint upon trade and commerce in the products made by the 
use of the know-how.40 Otherwise stated, there is no violation of 
84 An:'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 231 (1955). 
85 35 u.s.c. § 154 (1958). 
86 DeForest Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927). 
37 Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Wheel Co., 154 Fed. 358 (7th Cir. 
1907), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 210 U.S. 439 (1908); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson &: 
Johnson, 109 F. Supp. 657, 660-61 (D.N.J. 1951). 
38 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938); Wes-
tinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co., 106 F. Supp. 819 (N.D.W. Va. 1952), 
afj'd, 206 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953). 
89 35 u.s.c. § 261 (1958). 
40 See John D. Park &: Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 30 (6th Cir. 1907), in which 
the court stated: "So long as the owner of such a secret can preserve its secrecy he has 
necessarily a monopoly in its use, and there is no illegal restraint because he refuses 
to make it public. Neither is the public interest affected whether the process or formula 
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the antitrust laws in limiting the communication of what the 
licensor might have refrained from communicating to anyone.41 
Thus, in Aktiebolaget Bo/ors v. United States, the court held that 
a licensor could validly limit its licensee in the use of a secret proc-
ess, stating: "But one who has lawfully acquired a trade secret 
may use it in any manner without liability unless he acquired it 
subject to a contractual limitation or restriction as to its use."42 
Similarly, licenses containing time limitations on the use of know-
how have been held valid,48 and, analogizing from patent licensing, 
there is little doubt that the know-how licensor may restrict his 
licensee with respect to the number, size, or description of the 
item to be produced.44 Another restraint which may be imposed 
upon the licensee-one which clearly falls within the scope of the 
know-how "grant"-is the obligation not to disclose the licensed 
know-how.411 
Unlike actions for patent infringement, no statutory action for 
know-how infringement can be maintained if the licensee exceeds 
the scope of his license; the action must sound in contract.46 
is used by A. or B. or by both, for there can be no restraint of trade in respect of a 
method or formula which is known only to the discoverer and those to whom he 
chooses to communicate it under restrictions. Having no right to compel a publication, 
the public lose no right by respecting a restricted disclosure, for no freedom of traffic 
has been stifled." In fact, legal actions against an employee for wrongful appropriation 
of trade secrets could be said to stem from the fact that the employer has disclosed his 
secret to him with an implied license restricting the use by the employee-licensee of the 
secret to that use which is beneficial to the employer as licensor. 
41 Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 2!16, 245 (1905) (opinion 
of Holmes, J.); cf. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
Holmes's statement might well apply to limits placed upon the products made from 
the know-how also, but it has not been unqualifiedly accepted in that regard. See John 
D. Park &: Sons Co. v. Hartman, 15!1 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
42 194 F.2d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1951). There was no specific contention in this case 
that antitrust laws had been violated. Moreover, the quoted statement is, in part, 
dictum, since the restraints in question were placed upon the goods made by use of 
the secret process, and not upon this use itself. 
48 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 858. But see the consent decree in United 
States v. Hughes Tool Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 7!1968 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
44 Restraints upon the number of units which could be produced under patent and 
know-how licenses have been held to be evidence of unlawful intent when combined 
with other antitrust violations. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 75!1, 
814 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 6!1 F. Supp. 51!1, 5!11-!12 (S.D.N.Y. 
1945). The questionable reasoning behind these findings is discussed in Part II(C)(4)(b) 
infra. 
41S John D. Park &: Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir. 1907); Spiselman v. 
Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1946). 
46 Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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C. Limitations Ancillary to the Know-How "Grant" 
In addition to the license restrictions upon the method, time, 
or place in which the know-how itself may be utilized, restraints 
upon the sale or use of the products made from the know-how 
have been upheld as ancillary to the know-how grant. The theory 
behind these restraints is deeply rooted in our law, and is suc-
cinctly outlined in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co.: 47 
"[A]gain, when one in business sold property with which the 
buyer might set up a rival business, it was certainly reasonable 
that the seller should be able to restrain the buyer from doing 
him an injury which, but for the sale, the buyer would be 
unable to inflict. This was not reducing competition but was 
only securing the seller against an increase of competition of 
his own creating. Such an exception was necessary to promote 
the free purchase and sale of property."48 
Restraints which litigants, arguing an ancillarity theory, have 
sought to justify upon products made through the use of know-
how have been (I) restraints placed upon the purchaser of prod-
ucts made from the know-how; (2) restraints tying the sale of 
unrelated products to the license of know-how, or prohibiting the 
licensee from dealing in competitive products; (3) restraints upon 
the price of the products charged by the licensee; and (4) limita-
tions with respect to the territory in which or customers to which 
the licensee may sell the products. 
I. Restraints Upon the Purchaser of Products Made by 
Use of the Know-How 
Despite early decisions to the contrary,49 it is now clear that the 
know-how licensor can place no greater restraints upon those who 
purchase goods made from his know-how than can the manufac-
turer of any other product. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co.,r,0 the Supreme Court invalidated under the Sher-
man Act a resale price maintenance program adopted by the 
owner of a secret process and held that he had lost his control over 
47 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afj'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
48 See also Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891). 
49 See, e.g., Wells &: Richardson Co. v. Abraham, 146 Fed. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1906), citing 
Park &: Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n, 175 N.Y. 1, 67 N.E. 136 (1905). 
50 220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911). 
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the product once it had been sold. Subsequent cases have uniform-
ly reaffirmed Dr. Miles on this point.51 
2. Tying Agreements and Restraints Against Dealing in 
Competitive Products 
There is little question that an agreement whereby the know-
how licensor requires his licensee to purchase unpatented products 
in order to obtain the license is illegal under section I of the Sher-
man Act if the requirements of the Times-Picayune52 and North-
ern Pacific58 cases are met. In Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court 
held that if a seller (or licensor) enjoyed a monopolistic position 
in the "tying product" (i.e., the know-how) and if a substantial 
volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, the tying 
arrangement violates section I of the Sherman Act.54 In Northern 
Pacific the Court watered down Times-Picayune by requiring 
proof only that the defendant had "sufficient economic power" 
over the tying product, and that a "not insubstantial" amount of 
commerce was affected.55 Although these cases involved the sale 
or lease of tangible property used as the tying product, the same 
rule would apply if a patent or know-how itself were used to tie 
in sales of other goods.56 Moreover, when a know-how license is 
used as a tying device a presumption of illegality would undoubt-
edly arise by reason of the imputed power stemming from the 
know-how itself. 57 In addition to these landmark tying cases the 
wording of opinions in certain know-how license cases indicates 
51 United States v. Bausch 8: Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944); United 
States v. A. Schrader's Sons, 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920). 
52 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
58 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
5i 345 U.S. 608-09 (1953). Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits leases or sales of 
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities . • • on the 
condition • • • that the lessee or purchaser shall not • • • deal in the goods • . • of 
a competitor." 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). Whether know-
how is a "commodity" within the meaning of this section remains to be seen. The 
intangible nature of know-how, in addition to the fact that it often involves extensive 
services, would lead to the conclusion that it is not. See United States v. Jerrold 
Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1960), a/j'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
55 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). 
56 "The patentee is protected as to his invention, but may not use his patent rights 
to exact tribute for other articles." United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
But see Steiner Sales Co. v. Schwartz Sales Co., 98 F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 
305 U.S. 622 (1939). 
57 The requisite economic power, for example, "is presumed when the tying product 
is patented or copyrighted •••• " United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). 
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that any restraint extending to products not embodying the know-
how is illegal. 158 
Nevertheless, the situation often arises in which know-how, 
patents and trademarks, all pertaining to one product, are licensed 
in a package, with the requirement that the licensee take all or 
none. Absent additional restraints, this would not seem to be 
illegal tying at all, since the "product" licensed is the bundle of 
industrial technology and property, all pertaining to the manu-
facture of designated goods.159 Indeed, when trademark licenses 
are granted, the concomitant license of know-how may be required 
to effectuate the transfer of the mark.60 
Seemingly analogous to the tying requirement is the licensor's 
prohibition against manufacture by the licensee of products simi-
lar to those made by the use of the granted technology. Such a 
restraint has been held unlawful in the case of patent licenses.61 
A similar result might well obtain with respect to know-how. The 
know-how licensor, however, can sometimes contend that the re-
straint against dealing in competitive products is no more than a 
restraint against the licensee's utilizing the know-how in an un-
authorized way. So long as the licensee cannot but wrongfully 
utilize the know-how if he manufactures competing products, the 
argument goes, no additional restraint has been exacted beyond 
that which is lawful. If this fact is true, the argument would seem 
sound. The contract in such a case is framed to prohibit the manu-
facture of competing products rather than the wrongful utilization 
of know-how, because breach of the former obligation necessarily 
indicates breach of the latter.62 
In addition, there is nothing wrong with requiring the licensee 
M See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 846 (D.N.J. 1949). 
59 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Engebricht v. Dairy 
Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 741 (D. Kan. 1962) (holding ice cream retail franchises valid 
which, in order to protect the trademarks involved, required the purchase of equipment 
and products from the franchisor and restricted the method of operation of the fran-
chisees). The court's dictum in Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd. v. Bendix Corp., 101 
ANTITRusr TRADE REG. REP. A-6 (D. Md., May 27, 1963), that know-how tied to a patent 
license might be illegal, appears aberrational, so long as the know-how and patents 
pertain to the same product. 
60 This is because a trademark is not assignable except in connection with the good 
will of the business which it symbolizes (Lanham Act § 10, 33 Stat. 727 (1905), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1060 (1958) ), and this good will is often dependent, in whole or in part, on the know• 
how -used in operating the business. 
61 Mccullogh v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 
U.S. 813 (1948). See also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236-37 (1892). 
62 See BREWSTER, ANTITRU5r AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 165-66 (1958), where the 
author notes the dangers of incorporating a contractual provision of this type. 
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to use his best efforts to promote the sale of the licensed products, 
with the simultaneous obligation not to sell competing products 
when such sales would injure the sales of the licensed products. 
In fact, the Second Circuit implied such a promise in one case 
involving the licensing of a secret process although it was not ex-
pressly provided for in the contract.68 
3. Restraints Upon the Price of the Goods Manufactured 
and Sold by the Licensee 
In the Dr. Miles case,64 the Supreme Court, while outlawing 
resale price maintenance, suggested that a "secret process may be 
the subject of ... sale or license to use with restrictions as to 
... price." This dictum has probably not survived as good law. 
The 1926 General Electric case,65 sanctioning price control by a 
product patent owner over his licensee, has been so narrowed by 
subsequent cases, principally Line Material66 and United States 
Gypsum,61 that reliance upon Dr. Miles or General Electric seems 
ill-advised, even with respect to patent licenses.68 
The know-how licensor faces an additional obstacle. Most 
know-how is analogous to a process patent, since the secret tech-
nology usually pertains to the method of manufacture rather than 
the product manufactured. There has never been uniform accept-
ance of the General Electric rule in the case of price fixing under 
process patents, since the price control there governs not a pat-
ented product, but an unpatented product made from a patented 
process.69 The nexus between the process patent grant and the 
68 Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach &: Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1941). The 
licensor, however, was denied injunctive relief against breach of this implied obligation. 
64 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &: Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911). 
65 United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 
66 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
67 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948). 
68 In Line Material, a majority of the Court was unable either to affirm or overrule 
General Electric. A majority, however, held that the General Electric ruli! did not 
apply to price fixing under a cross-licensing arrangement, with control over the prices 
of other manufacturers by one cross-licensee. In United States Gypsum, the Court held 
that a single patentee cannot control the prices of all the licensee-manufacturers in an 
industry, at least if concert of action may be inferred. Subsequent cases have further 
narrowed the scope of permissible price fixing. See United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 
342 U.S. 371, 380 (1952); Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 293 
(3d Cir. 1956). 
60 Compare Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Elec. Co., 82 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 
1936), with Barber-Colman Co. v. National Lead Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943); 
Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1944); Amer-
ican Equip. Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934). See 
the commentary on this subject in Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 649 (S.D.N.Y 
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unpatented product made by the licensee has appeared too re-
mote for some courts to apply the General Electric rule, even 
when the licensor can skirt the limitations of Line Material and 
United States Gypsum. The analogy to the process patent cases, 
therefore, would indicate that price control exercised over a know-
how licensee is unlawful. 
4. Territorial Restraints 
By far the greatest controversy with respect to the know-how 
ancillarity doctrine has raged over agreements between a licensor 
and licensee providing for territorial limitations upon sales of 
the goods made pursuant to the know-how.70 Enforcement of this 
type of restriction is more important to the licensor than en-
forcement of those previously considered. It is, therefore, worthy 
of historical analysis. 
a. The Early Cases 
One year before the passage of the Sherman Act, the Supreme 
Court was faced with an agreement between the owner and his 
licensee under a secret formula for "Wistar's Balsam of Wild 
Cherry" in which each agreed to stay out of the other's designated 
territory.71 The licensee challenged the agreement as an invalid 
common-law restraint on trade in the product. In rejecting this 
contention and enforcing the agreement, the Supreme Court held 
the territorial restraint upon the sale of the products made from 
the process to be valid and ancillary to the grant of the process 
itself, even though the restraint was unlimited as to time.72 
1962). See also United States v. General Elec. Co. (Carboloy), 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948). 
70 Similar considerations to those outlined in this section would apply to restraints 
upon the type of customers to which the licensee can sell. One limitation of this sort 
seems to involve no difficulty, however, and that is a requirement that the licensee 
manufacture solely for the licensor. In United States v. Bausch 8e Lomb Optical Co., 
45 F. Supp. 387, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the court assumed that 
such an agreement would be proper, stating: "It is not necessary to find, and I do not 
find that Soft-Lite's specifications for the glass constituted a secret formula for the pro-
tection of which a restraining covenant [prohibiting the licensee from selling to others 
than Soft-Lite, the licensor] would be proper." 
71 Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889). 
72 Id. at 97. The court undoubtedly recognized that, although the contract con-
tained no time limitation, under accepted common-law contract doctrine it would ter• 
minate when the secret process was disclosed. See note 129 infra; cf. United States 
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio, 1949), aff'd, 351 U.S. 593 
(1951). 
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In 1911, the Supreme Court took occasion in the Dr. Miles 
case78 to reaffirm its prior holding, despite the intervening enact-
ment of the Sherman Act. Although it struck down restraints 
placed upon the purchaser of the product, the court distinguished 
restraints upon a purchaser from those restricting a licensee, stat-
ing: "The secret process may be the subject of confidential com-
munication and of sale or license to use with restrictions as to 
territory and price."74 The broad criterion of ancillarity in know-
how licensing thus was directly applied vis-a-vis the Sherman Act. 
The territorial limitation was upheld, as in a sale of a business, 
because it was reasonable "to restrain the buyer [of the know-how] 
from doing him [the seller] an injury which, but for the sale, the 
buyer would be unable to inflict."75 As late as 1931, one court 
of appeals still considered the law to be "not open to question" 
that territorial restrictions were valid when accompanied by a 
grant of know-how.76 
b. The Attack Upon the Territorial Ancillarity Doctrine 
With the National Lead77 decision in 1947, however, new cri-
teria began to creep into determinations of the legality of ancillary 
territorial restraints, eventually resulting in judicial skepticism 
toward the know-how ancillarity doctrine itself. Although the 
National Lead case was primarily concerned with patent licensing, 
it is instructive because of the departure in reasoning from prior 
decisions both in the patent and know-how fields. Moreover, the 
theme of the opinion has been adopted, with variations, in sub-
sequent decisions involving know-how licensing. 
In 1920, National Lead, through its subsidiary Titanium Pig-
ments Company, Inc., entered into an agreement with a European 
company, Titan, A.S., pursuant to which each party granted licen-
1s Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park 8: Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
74 Id. at 402. 
75 United States v. Addyston Pipe 8: Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), afj'd, 
175 U.S. 221 (1899). 
76 Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592, 595 (3d Cir. 1931). The matter at issue in 
Thoms was the validity under the antitrust laws of the sale of the business in four 
countries by a German company to Eastman Kodak, in exchange for Eastman's stock. 
Eastman subsequently claimed that the stock was issued for an unlawful consideration. 
The court, however, held that the contract was a valid sale of a going business and 
the territorial restraints were reasonably ancillary thereto, even though the business 
went beyond the use of the secret process. The statements quoted in the text refer to 
the court's construction of a prior contract referring solely to the sale of a secret process, 
accompanied by a division of territories. 
77 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 332 
U.S. 319 (1947). 
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ses to the other for every "invention, improvement or subject 
matter under existing and future letters patent" held by the par-
ties pertaining to the "licensed field," which was defined to include 
certain titanium pigments.78 Under the licenses Titan obtained 
exclusive rights in the licensed field to the patents and know-how 
in all areas outside of North and South America, and Titanium 
Pigments obtained similar rights in North and Central America. 
The parties granted each other non-exclusive rights in South 
America. Competition was completely precluded since each party 
appointed the other its exclusive agent in the respective exclusive 
areas for distribution of those products falling within the licensed 
field, and could sell only upon order of its agent. In addition, each 
party agreed to make available to the other all present and future 
patent applications and other technological information relating 
to the licensed field, and further agreed not to attack the validity 
of the other's patents. Products containing titanium pigments 
could be exported into the other party's territory so long as this 
did not interfere with the other's sales of titanium pigments. Sub-
licenses were allowed, provided that the sublicensees would abide 
by the territorial limitations of the 1920 agreement and would 
contribute to the other party to the 1920 agreement exclusive 
rights in such patents that they might have outside the territory 
of their licensor. 
Subsequent sublicense arrangements entered into by the par-
ties to the 1920 agreement subjected the sublicensees to the same 
restraints found in the agreement, either expressly, or, as the court 
found in the case of the du Pont Company, impliedly. In addition, 
the European licenses often provided for price fixing and limits 
on production of the products. 
In holding the principal cross-license and the subsequent sub-
licensing arrangements to be contracts in violation of section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, the district court based its opinion on solid 
ground by pointing out that the contracts not only prevented com-
petition in patented products but also divided territories in un-
patented products, and therefore constituted naked restraints of 
trade; 79 that the contracts restrained the disposition of products 
78 Id. at 517. 
79 Apparently no contention was made that the exchange of unpatented confidential 
technical information could also support a territorial restraint, nor is there any indi-
cation that all the unpatented products subject to the restraints were manufactured 
through the use of such information. 
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after sale by the licensees; and that the contracts by their terms 
extended to production of titanium pigments beyond the term of 
any patents then existing. 80 The court also pointed to the illegality 
of that portion of the agreements acknowledging the validity of 
future patents which might be issued for inventions not then con-
ceived, and for which no patent application had been fi.led.81 The 
court further noted that the restraints extended to countries which 
did not recognize or protect patents.82 Concluded the court: "[I]t 
is now well settled that a license may not be used to extend the 
patent monopoly beyond its terms."83 
The court thus fully answered the contention that the contrac-
tual restraints were ancillary to a patent grant by finding simply 
that they were not ancillary restraints at all. At this point, how-
ever, the opinion delved into a discussion of the ancillarity doc-
trine itself. Noting that the Addyston Pipe case84 approved terri-
torial restraints as ancillary to the sale of a business, the court 
attempted to distinguish that case upon two grounds. In the first 
place, the court stated, there was no business to sell. "At best, each 
[party] had an opportunity and a hope."85 Second, the primary 
"intent" of the parties here was "to restrain trade in order to 
avoid competition . . ." and, therefore, no question of ancillarity 
could arise.86 
80 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 
322 U.S. 319 (1947). 
81 See also United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. 386 (1945); Pope Mfg. Co. 
v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892). 
82 A persuasive argument might be made here that as long as the United States 
exports its antitrust laws and imposes them on contracts which are valid in countries 
in which they are made or performed (see, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide 
&: Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 
Ltd., [1954] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.)), it should also export its own concepts of industrial prop· 
erty and its protection. The rationale for applying American antitrust laws to contracts 
enforceable in the country where made is that the restraints are injurious to our foreign 
commerce even though the acts are valid under foreign law. The reverse, however, is 
also true. From the standpoint of this country, a restraint upon United States exports is 
no different when the export is going to a country in which there is no patent protection 
to justify the restriction than when the export is going to a country in which the restraint 
would be justified by foreign patent grants. 
88 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 
332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
84 United States v. Addyston Pipe &: Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
85 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 
332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
86 Ibid. On appeal, National Lead and Titan accepted the cancellation of the 
license agreements. The Supreme Court's opinion, affirming that of the district court, 
is directed primarily at the scope of relief to be ordered and includes an interesting 
discussion on the necessity for and terms of an order requiring the compulsory disclosure 
of know-how and technical information. See 332 U.S. 353-59 (1947). 
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Following on the heels of National Lead was the General Elec-
tric Carboloy case.87 Carboloy, like National Lead, involved a divi-
sion of territories in the hard metal composition industry pursuant 
to patent license arrangements between General Electric and its sub-
sidiaries, on the one hand, and the German manufacturer, Krupp, 
A.G., on the other hand. General Electric received exclusive rights 
in the United States and Canada and agreed to refrain from ex-
porting elsewhere. Once again, the patent rights of the parties 
were found to have been "pushed to evil consequences," thus sub-
jecting the defendants to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.BB 
Price agreements on the products manufactured were found to be 
an integral part of the agreement and thereby illegal under the 
Line Material doctrine.89 Moreover, certain naked price-fixing 
arrangements, outside the scope of any patent justification, were 
discerned. Sublicensees were required to grant back patent licen-
ses (usually exclusive) covering the products, in violation of the 
rule-of-reason limitations of Transparent-Wrap.90 Resale price 
maintenance in the form of sham agency agreements was found,91 
and non-signers were held to have been boycotted by the defend-
ants. 92 The purchase of competitors was determined to have been 
consummated with intent to exclude competition, i.e., to monop-
olize.93 Most important from the standpoint of this discussion, the 
territorial restrictions were construed by the court to apply to all 
exports of products in this industry by Krupp and General Elec-
tric, not merely to those products made from patented processes.94 
Once again the court assumed, without deciding, that a patent 
cross-licensing arrangement might contain territorial restrictions. 
The agreements in question failed, however, because of the un-
lawful "intent" of the parties. 95 
This, then, was the legacy of rulings facing the court in the 
General Electric Lamp case,96 in which the legality of know-how 
87 United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
88 Id. at 1004. 
89 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). In fact, this price control 
extended to the sale by sublicensees of unpatented products made from the patented 
process, a practice which the Court also found illegal. 
90 Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). 
91 United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1006-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
92 Id. at 1009. 
93 Id. at 1009-10. 
94 Id. at 1009. 
95 Ibid. 
96 United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). For the weary 
reader of this 153-page opinion, an excellent capsule factual summary and excerpt of 
1964] KNow-How LICENSING 369 
licenses accompanied by territorial restraints was directly in issue. 
General Electric was charged with restraining trade and monopo-
lizing the incandescent lamp industry, in part through foreign 
agreements designed "(I) to prevent the sale in the United States 
of lamps made by foreign companies; (2) to prevent domestic lamp 
manufacturers from obtaining lamp parts and lamp making ma-
chinery from foreign concerns; and (3) to acquire for itself inven-
tions and patents developed by foreign companies, principally to 
increase its pool of patents and prevent other domestic lamp manu-
facturers from obtaining rights under such patents."97 
These objectives were allegedly furthered by the execution in 
1924 of the so-called "Phoebus" agreement, in which various sub-
sidiaries of General Electric and other foreign manufacturers 
agreed to exchange technical information in return for promises 
to limit their participation in foreign lamp markets to a fixed per-
centage of each other's sales.98 The Phoebus agreement was re-
inforced by license contracts of patents and technical information 
granted by International General Electric to foreign licensees 
which restricted the licensees to defined territories "with the 
United States and Canada recognized as being excluded."99 Accord-
ing to the court's interpretation of these contracts, domestic 
licensees of General Electric were similarly prohibited from selling 
abroad. 
General Electric, in defense, argued that the territorial re-
straints in its licenses were valid as ancillary to an exchange of 
manufacturing information.100 In analyzing this defense, the court, 
that part of the opinion concerning foreign know-how licensing is found in OPPENHEIM, 
FEDERAL ANTITRusr LAws 973-80 (2d ed. 1959). 
97 United States v. General Elec. Co., supra note 96, at 827. 
08 Id. at 835. Trade between the United States and foreign countries was not pro-
hibited on the face of the Phoebus agreement. 
oo Id. at 837. 
100 Id. at 845. The court summarized the argument as follows: "General Electric 
argued that territorial restraints in its licenses were reasonable and therefore valid as 
ancillary to an exchange of manufacturing information. In support of its argument it 
contended that the exchange of technical and manufacturing information and 'know-
how' was a primary purpose of the license agreements, and was clearly evidenced by its 
substance and importance. It referred to the mass of accumulated industrial informa-
tion which it had compiled and argued that the 'protection of one's labor is afforded 
even though the subject matter may not be strictly a "trade secret." It may stand 
"like a trade secret." • It claimed that the parties to the license agreements sought tech-
nical and manufacturing information and 'know-how' and sought access to each other's 
research laboratories and that the material involved was of the utmost importance. It 
insisted that the 'ancillary restraints were not to eliminate or even reduce potential 
or actual competition, but were simply to protect the parties against competition which 
would only have been of their own creating.' In concluding it insisted that the proofs 
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as in National Lead, made several observations which, in and of 
themselves, refuted General Electric's contentions. The court 
pointed out that the know-how had not been shown to be a trade 
secret. Although voluminous technical material had been ex-
changed, "the secret and confidential nature of the material had 
not been exhibited."101 Moreover, the court correctly ascertained 
that: "The restraints exercised under a patent grant are circum-
scribed within narrow limits and measured by the precise terms 
of the grant, but restraints exercised under authority of 'know-
how' are measured by the use made of it."102 The defendants had 
not shown that all products which were the subject of contractual 
restraints either embodied or were built by use of the granted 
technical data. Thus, the court impliedly found that whatever 
know-how had existed had been "misused" by conditioning its 
grant upon naked territorial restraints placed upon other products 
in the manufacture of which know-how was not utilized. By analo-
gizing from the patent misuse doctrine, the court could have justi-
fied the finding and the relief granted on this basis alone.108 
Nevertheless, the court once again paid obeisance to the slip-
pery doctrine of unlawful intent as the criterion of illegality of 
the license agreements: 
"It has been all too evident that the primary purpose of the 
foreign licenses was to restrict competition in the United 
States by dividing markets in the foreign countries, all geared 
to the Phoebus agreement and domestic licenses to reduce in-
terest of potential foreign competition in United States trade. 
There is in the foreign licenses a striking similarity to the 
situation interdicted in United States v. National Lead Co. 
"104 
Unlike the National Lead case, however, the court went on to 
established that patented inventions and a vast body of 'ever-changing manufacturing 
information and "know-how" has been exchanged between International General Electric 
and its foreign licensees.' " Ibid. 
101 Id. at 846. 
102 Ibid. 
10s The court also observed that General Electric's witnesses could give no clear 
definition of the know-how which was granted. Ibid. 
104 Id. at 847. Strangely, the court looked to and quoted that portion of the Dr. 
Miles case, which struck down restraints upon a distributor by the owners of a secret 
process, to support its conclusion that the restraints upon licensees were illegal. Id. 
at 846. That portion of the Dr. Miles case sanctioning restraints upon licensees was 
ignored. 
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place in question the legal capacity of the know-how licensor to 
restrain his licensee territorially in any case: 
"Reflecting these expressions upon the circumstances of this 
case without conceding that the exchange of 'know-how' 
could be the basis for territorial restrictions, the parties to the 
contracts herein are found to have received their quid pro 
quo in the mutual exchange of valuable information each to 
the other. The interest of the public in the world wide divi-
sions of territory set up and the far flung effects upon com-
petition and trade encompassed in them is very great. No mat-
ter how reasonable the restraints have been considered as 
between the contracting parties they were entirely unreason-
able in so far as the interest of the public is concerned."105 
Later in the same year as General Electric Lamp came the sim-
ilar case of United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.106 Here 
the defendant, Timken, a manufacturer of tapered anti-friction 
roller bearings, entered into contracts with British and French 
subsidiaries, licensing these subsidiaries first under patents and, 
upon the expiration of the patents, under so-called know-how 
grants. The licenses divided the world into sales territories and 
fixed prices on the licensed products. The parties also agreed ex-
clusively to exchange and pool know-how, the antitrust effect of 
which has previously been discussed.107 
Once again the district court found the requisite unlawful 
"intent" to restrain competition, noting that even the defendants 
admitted that there was no competition between the United 
States, British and French companies. The court further rejected 
a number of defenses proffered by Timken, including the defense 
that the territorial restraint was ancillary to an agreement to fur-
nish know-how to its affiliates.108 To this last contention, the court 
replied that the so-called "know-how" furnished by Timken was 
not secret,109 a fact which, as in National Lead, Carboloy, and 
105 Id. at 847. (Emphasis added.) 
106 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), af/'d, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
107 See Part II(A) supra. In addition, Timken and its subsidiaries were found to 
have joined at one time with their European competitors in a division of markets which 
restrained American exports, and, at other times, to have combined among themselves 
to combat this competition. 
108 One of the principal defenses, not relevant here, was that a corporation is not 
capable of conspiring with its subsidiaries. 
100 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313 (N.D. Ohio 
1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The court pointed out that other manufacturers were 
given free access to the plants of British and French Timken. 
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Lamp, turns the territorial restraints into per se violations of the 
Sherman Act.110 The court continued by noting that the know-how 
merely involved certain manufacturing skills pertaining to a proc-
ess, the patents upon which had expired. Although recognizing 
the right to compensation for know-how, the court rejected the 
notion that such compensation might legitimately include, 
through contract, complete freedom from competition, and con-
cluded with an attack on know-how based upon a previously 
unmentioned attribute-its indefinite duration: "If lawful re-
straints and monopolies could be predicated on the ownership of 
know-how they could last ad infinitum. This Court cannot sub-
scribe to such unharnessed privilege."111 The judgment was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court, without specific reference to the 
"know-how" defense.112 
The nadir of the fortunes of restraints based upon know-how 
was reached in the Imperial Chem. Indus. (I.C.I.) case.113 Once 
again the defendants, this time in the chemical industry, had 
woven a network of cross license agreements with major manu-
facturers throughout the world, territorially restricting sales of a 
multitude of products made, according to their contracts, under 
patents and secret processes. Once again, evidence abounded that 
the know-how and/ or patents covered by the agreements simply 
did not have value sufficient to sustain territorial restraints. For 
example, the court noted that: 
"The decisive inquiry would appear to be whether or not the 
bulk of inventions licensed had, or were expected to have, 
any appreciable royalty value. The proof demonstrates that 
many of the inventions licensed did not have such value, but 
were nevertheless made the basis for a territorial allocation. 
The inference necessarily follows that the territorial division 
was the real purpose of the arrangement."114 
110 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
111 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313-14 (N.D. Ohio 
1949), afj'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). The court's attack on know-how also found expression 
in the following statement: "During the existence of the tapered bearing patents de-
fendant could not legally allocate markets on processes which were not within the ambit 
of its patent monopoly. Therefore, it defies all sense of logic to say that -upon the 
expiration of the patents defendant could lawfully engage in like conduct and practices 
upon the theory of supplying know-how on unpatended processes.'' Id. at 313. 
112 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1957). The Court 
did observe that its "prior decisions plainly establish that agreements providing for an 
aggregation of trade restraints such as those existing in this case are illegal under the 
act.'' Id. at 598. 
113 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
114 Id. at 528. In addition, the court found that "of the great mass of inventions 
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Nevertheless, the court once more lunged into a detailed analysis 
of the record to ascertain the real "intent" of the defendants. 
Nothing escaped its critical eye. Any letters or memoranda refer-
ring to the division of sales of products by territory, unqualified by 
a reference to the technology exchanged, were looked upon as 
evidence of guilt. The statement in one letter that an agreement 
"must take the form of an agreement to purchase and sell ex-
clusive and non-exclusive licenses to patents and secret processes" 
was construed as evidence that the real understanding was other-
wise.1111 
In sharp contrast to National Lead, in which the court found 
illegality because the licensing of products was unaccompanied by 
the sale of a business, the court in I.C.I. found that compensation 
based upon the sale of a business and withdrawal from the terri-
tory was a "subterfuge for a territorial understanding."116 The 
court concluded without deciding upon the per se illegality of 
licensing agreements containing territorial restraints, 117 finding 
that in any case the agreements "were instruments designed and 
intended to accomplish the world-wide allocation of markets."118 
The essential holdings of the National Lead, General Electric 
Lamp, Timken, and J.C.I. cases may be stated as follows: if a sys-
tem of territorial restraints is exacted by licensing agreements 
and the accompanying grant of industrial technology (patented or 
secret) does not cover all the products which are the subject of the 
restraints, the entire system of agreements is unenforceable and 
illegal, although the grant of technology may be sufficient to sup-
port some territorial restraints with respect to some products. 
Precedent for this rule is abundant in the patent misuse field119 
and in the broader antitrust doctrine that lawful acts, when inter-
exchanged, each one of which could contribute to a territorial withdrawal, only a small 
proportion were considered by the parties to have sufficient economic value to be the 
subject of specific monetary assessment." Id. at 548. 
1111 There is no question that the parties to the I.C.I. agreements sometimes seemed 
to be more concerned with the United States antitrust laws than with licensing of 
technology. Nevertheless, this is not conclusive proof that the parties intended to evade 
these laws, as opposed to avoiding them. Certainly, a licensor of know-how need not 
pretend that the antitrust laws do not exist. 
110 Id. at 537. 
111 Id. at 592. 
118 Ibid. 
110 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942): "The patentee, 
like these other holders of an exclusive privilege granted in the furtherance of a public 
policy, may not claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is being used to 
subvert that policy." 
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twined with unlawful conduct, may be enjoined if this is necessary 
to prevent frustration of "the broad public policy of the antitrust 
laws."120 To imply, as these cases do, however, that the ultimate 
validity of any territorial restraint accompanying a patent or 
know-how license turns upon the "intent" of the parties does not 
stand analysis. The ascertainment of the true "intent" of the par-
ties in this situation is chimerical, since both in the case of a valid 
license of substantial know-how with an accompanying ancillary 
restraint, and that of a naked division of territories between com-
petitors, the parties blatantly intend not to compete with each 
other with respect to the products involved. In both cases, more-
over, payment is made from one party to the other in return for 
the other's promise not to compete.121 Finally, the agreement in 
both cases is intended to maximize the profits of each party in its 
respective territory. The only objectively ascertainable difference 
between an ancillary territorial restraint and a naked division of 
territories, therefore, is that in one case the agreement is accom-
panied by a substantial grant of valuable and confidential tech-
nology enabling the grantee to operate in a manner in which he 
could not otherwise have operated without lengthy, tedious and 
expensive research, whereas in the other case this element is ab-
sent. The sole touchstone of legality, thus, is an analysis of the 
technical data granted and used. If this technology is substantial, 
valuable and secret, the restraint should be upheld as ancillary 
to it; if not, the restraint falls for lack of ancillarity. In evaluating 
the exchange of know-how, a quantitative assessment of the time 
and money required to produce it is, of course, extremely relevant. 
Such an evaluation may also properly include an assessment of the 
efforts required of the licensee to make the same product as effi-
ciently without the granted know-how. In this context the fact 
that the parties, as competitors, cross-license each other with re-
spect to know-how pertaining to the same products is some indica-
tion, aside from any question of intent, that neither of the parties 
really granted the other sufficient "value" to support a territorial 
restraint. Lack of any payment under the license tends also to show 
lack of value in the granted know-how. Moreover, as there is an 
increase in the number of products for which the territorial re-
120 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 96, at 22. 
121 Although in the case of a know-how grant, the payment is also made for the 
valuable know-how itself, the actual segregation of the payment of money from a licensee 
to his licensor can be accomplished only in the unlikely case that the parties segregate 
it themselves. 
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straints are sought to be sustained, there is a decreasing probability 
that the know-how is sufficient to sustain restraints as to all prod-
ucts. Perhaps, as the Supreme Court stated in Timken, "an aggre-
gation of trade restraints such as those existing in this case [in-
volving an entire industry] are illegal under the act."122 Certainly, 
the more products involved, the more difficult it is to believe that 
the know-how granted is sufficiently valuable to restrain the sales 
of each product. These and other considerations are relevant in 
determining whether the know-how granted has sufficient value to 
justify the licensor in representing to a court that, but for the 
grant of technology, there would be no competition in the fore-
seeable future from the licensee. When the granted and utilized 
know-how attains this stature, it should not matter that represent-
atives of the parties talk in terms of restraining a given product 
without noting each time that the restraint is exacted only be-
cause of the know-how through which the product is made; that 
the parties attempt to frame their agreements to avoid the antitrust 
laws; or even that some corporate officer attempts to create the 
impression with his superiors that he has organized an economic 
empire. The ancillarity of the restraint should depend solely upon 
the extent of the transfer of property or value, and not upon the 
intent of the parties. That intent is always admittedly and openly 
to restrain.123 
The argument that know-how is not a business, but is at best 
"an opportunity and a hope,"124 is also unrealistic. As has been 
pointed out, know-how in its most valuable form can constitute 
the backbone or structure of a business. The competitive impor-
tance of know-how is vividly attested to by the Supreme Court in 
National Lead. Rejecting the Government's contention that the 
122 See note II2 supra. 
128 In most cases in which restraints are tested by the Rule of Reason, a lawful 
"business purpose" is one of the relevant factors tending to prove the reasonableness 
of the restraint. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). 
Purpose or intent ordinarily is relevant, however, because "the existence of a preda-
tory intent bears upon the likelihood of injury to competition .... " FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960). If the know-how licensor proves that his grant 
was necessary to enable the licensee to compete in the manufacture of the products 
involved, however, he will have disproved the likelihood of injury to competition, and 
thus rendered irrelevant an inquiry into his intent. For this reason, and because of 
the inherent ambiguity found in the licensor's expressions of "intent," the intent issue 
should not be determinative of the legality of competitive restraints in know-how licenses, 
despite its importance in the usual application of the Rule of Reason. 
124 United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), afj'd, 
332 U.S. 319 (1947). 
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defendants should be required to disclose future know-how, the 
Court stated: 
"The attempt of the Government to throw the field of techni-
cal knowledge in the titanium pigment industry wide-open 
would reduce the competitive value of the independent re-
search of the parties. It would discourage rather than en-
courage competitive research. It would be contrary to, rather 
than in conformity with, the policy of the patent laws now in 
force."125 
Similarly, in the I.C.I. remedy case the court evaluated know-how, 
even when it only supplemented existing patents, as "necessary to 
the efficient use of the licensed patents and to the production by 
the licensee of products comparable in quality and cost of produc-
tion to that of the licensor."126 
Further recognition of the real value of know-how is found in 
the cases holding know-how pooling agreements to be illegal.121 
Certainly, if an agreement between competitors to pool their 
know-how to the exclusion of others is considered to be in viola-
tion of the antitrust laws because of its competitive importance, 
the know-how involved is more than "an opportunity and a hope." 
The fact that the courts have held that the unlawful accumulation 
of know-how may result in the unlawful prevention or restraint 
upon competition is implicit recognition that lawfully accumu-
lated know-how affords its owner the power lawfully to prevent 
competition. This being the case, there should be no antitrust 
difficulty when the owner grants another the right to utilize the 
know-how under the condition that the grantee limit the sale of 
goods made from the know-how to a given area. Such an arrange-
ment serves to encourage competitive research without lessening 
competition in the products made from the know-how.128 The 
125 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 359 (1947). 
126 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 
1952). The court ordered compulsory licensing of both existing patents and know-how. 
With respect to future technology, the court concluded, as in National Lead, that com-
pulsory licensing would discourage, not encourage, future research. Id. at 222. 
121 See Part II(A) supra. 
128 As the Attorney General's Committee stated, "Private American investment abroad 
may often be dependent upon opportunities for capitalizing on patent rights and 'know-
how' through sale, exchange or licensing of such rights in transactions with foreign 
companies ...• This reciprocal interest would normally involve the safeguarding of 
the investment of each of the participants in the markets at home and abroad where 
their resources are used to develop such markets .•.. We also believe that unpatented 
inventions, know-how, or other trade secret information may give rise to a lawful pur-
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rationale of ancillary restraints expounded in Addyston Pipe, 
therefore, is directly applicable to grants of know-how. 
Finally, the criticism expressed by the district court in I.G.l., 
that restraints placed upon the parties by a know-how license 
agreement last indefinitely into the future, should not be disabling 
to those restraints. If the know-how later becomes publicly known 
(at least without the fault of the licensee), the continued enforce-
ment of the contract, under accepted antitrust principles, would 
then be in restraint of trade, but the contract need not be held 
illegal from the start.129 Moreover, under contract law the subse-
quent destruction of the know-how as a trade secret would cause 
the agreement, and thus the restraints, to terminate at that time.130 
Parties to a licensing agreement, of course, might provide for ter-
mination in such an event.131 
c. Subsequent Support for Ancillary Territorial Restraints 
As if to punctuate the conclusions reached above, two cases fol-
lowing the I.G.I. decision have supported ancillary territorial re-
straints appended to know-how licensing agreements. In Foundry 
pose to which some restrictions on competition may be reasonably ancillary." An'Y 
GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 86-88 (1955). 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 
1960), afj'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), in which the court held that a series of tying arrange-
ments, valid at their inception, could, by reason of changes in the factual background 
of the arrangements, later become unreasonable restraints in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act. 
180 Thus, in Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922), the court 
held that a patent licensee was justified in repudiating the license "whenever he ascer-
tains that the patents covered by the license agreement are invalid • • •. " Id. at 348. 
This is nothing more than an application of the doctrine that the destruction of a 
thing necessary to continued performance of a contract excuses the promisor from 
further performance. See 6 WILusroN, CoNTRAcrs §§ 1946, 1948 (Rev. ed. 1958). Brew-
ster nevertheless suggests that a specific time limit should be inserted in know-how 
licenses. BREWSTER, ANTITRusr AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 450 (1958). Besides ignor-
ing the authorities cited in this footnote, such a provision is disadvantageous from a tax 
standpoint. See United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955), holding that 
capital gains treatment will be denied to the transferor of know-how who retains a 
right of "provable substantial value." Compare Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. 
v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afj'd, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 
1960), in which the intent of the parties as found by the court under the peculiar facts 
of the case was to continue license payments after the formula became public knowledge. 
1s1 The German Federal Cartel Agency, with which certain patent and know-how 
licenses operable in Germany must be registered, requires a contractual provision en-
abling the licensee to terminate in case the know-how becomes public through no fault 
of the licensee. See the German Act Against Restraints of Competition of 27 July 1957, 
§ 20(2), and the Decision of February 1962, 4th Division, Bundeskartellamt; 12 WIRT-
SCHAIT UND WETIBEWERB 555 (WuW-E 465, July-August 1962). 
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Services, Inc. v. Benefiux Corp.132 a territorial restraint accom-
panying a license of a secret process for manufacturing fluxes was 
upheld when it was shown that the parties were not competitors 
prior to the license, and that the license did not encompass an 
entire industry or control the products made from the flux to 
which the process pertained. The court concluded that the "exclu-
sive license agreement of the type here attacked is probably as 
old, as 'normal,' as 'usual' and indeed as necessary as any type of 
contract" to further trade "in use among civilized men."133 
In the du Pont Cellophane case184 the court sustained an ex-
clusive license for moisture-proof cellophane granted by LaCello-
phane to a joint venture company owned by du Pont and LaCello-
phane in return for the promise by the jointly owned company to 
limit its sales of this type of cellophane to North and Central 
America. The valuation placed upon the secret process and tech-
nical assistance by the parties in forming the joint venture com-
pany was approximately 700,000 dollars,135 and the estimated time 
needed for du Pont to manufacture moisture-proof cellophane was 
at least five years.186 Finding that the process was "secret, novel and 
of commercial value,"137 the court concluded: 
"It is not the purpose of the Sherman Act or the common law 
of restraints· of trade to discourage establishment of a new 
business in a new territory. Trade secrets have always been 
considered in the nature of a property right. . . . Among 
the ancillary restraints which are considered reasonable, both 
under common law and the Sherman Act, are those which 
limit territory in which the contracting parties may use the 
trade secret."138 
182 llO F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953). 
133 Id. at 861. Apparently there was no dispute that the process was secret and 
valuable. The judgment granting a preliminary injunction was reversed on appeal on 
the ground that the plaintiff had not shown irreparable injury. 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 
1953). The appellate coun refused to pass on the antitrust issue, although commenting 
that the district court's opinion was "well reasoned," since it felt that the issue could 
be better decided after trial. Judge Hand, citing Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach &: Sons, 
Inc., 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941), concurred because of doubts that the plaintiff could obtain 
an injunction in any case, even though the contract was enforceable. 
134 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1952), 
aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
135 Id. at 58. 
136 Id. at 59. 
137 Id. at 218. 
138 Id. at 219. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the question of the 
legality of the licenses involved. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, 
dissenting, concluded that "the agreement • • . in which the parties agreed to divide 
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Thus, the territorial restraint is and should be valid and en-
forceable when incorporated in a license of substantial, valuable, 
secret know-how, so long as the restraint is limited in time (ex-
pressly or impliedly) to the "life" of the know-how, and to those 
products made by use of the know-how. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Despite the deprecatory comments which have been levelled 
at the value and nature of know-how in several recent opinions, 
its position with respect to the antitrust laws has remained approxi-
mately comparable to that of patents. This is both sensible and 
just. The economic value of know-how can be, and often is, equal 
to or greater than that embodied in patents. 
With respect to foreign licensing in particular, the know-how 
licensor should be entitled to protect himself from the competition 
of his licensee. In addition to the fact that this restraint does not 
decrease competition in the case of a license of valuable technol-
ogy, the use of know-how may be forced upon the licensor by rea-
son of foreign patent laws. The breadth of patent protection 
afforded by foreign jurisdictions often does not equal that avail-
able in this country. Nevertheless, the foreign patent protection 
which the United States firm can obtain often determines its 
domestic antitrust liability for territorial restrictions which it 
places on its patent licensees. The United States firm, moreover, 
often has difficulty enforcing its rights under foreign patents 
against local concerns. These concerns may even flee to a jurisdic-
tion which offers no patent protection in order to take advantage 
of information disclosed in patents issued elsewhere. Because of 
this undesirable state of affairs, the United States firm often chooses 
to keep its technology secret, and disclose this technology as 
know-how only to licensees in whose integrity it has confidence. 
There is certainly no reason why it should be forced to fall back 
on tenuous foreign patent protection to shield itself from our 
antitrust laws. 
Perhaps the judicial doubts expressed with respect to restraints 
in connection with know-how licenses result from a suspicion that 
the world cellophane market, is illegal per se under Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United 
States •.•• The supplementary agreement providing for the interchange of techno• 
logical information tightened the cellophane monopoly •••• " 351 U.S. 377, 419 n.7 
(1956). 
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these licenses may easily serve as a convenient dodge for the cartel-
minded firm. Whether there is substance or subterfuge in know-
how license restraints, however, can be ascertained by testing the 
value of the know-how granted. The businessman, therefore, who 
has built through his research a saleable competitive "asset" should 
not suffer because others inaccurately label naked territorial agree-
ments in restraint of trade as know-how licenses. 
